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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE -COMMENT

-APPEALABILITY

AND FINALITY IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT-Is THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT MORE APPEALING THAN THE THIRD CIRCUIT?

I. INTRODUCTION

A basic concern of litigants seeking an appeal is at what stage of the
proceedings an appeal may be taken. The more complex the litigation, the
more often it will be argued that isolated issues or preliminary motions
should be heard on appeal prior to the conclusion of the trial. Unrestricted,
appeals from preliminary orders would lead to piecemeal review, resulting
in overwhelming and unmanageable appellate dockets as well as enhancing
the danger of great delay and enormous cost.
Although there is no constitutional right to appeal,' several statutes authorize appeals in the federal court system. Section 1291 of the Judicial
Code, 2 which reflects the common law, 3 allows appeals from final decisions
of the district courts. 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, however, has proven to be more reluctant than the United States
Supreme Court in finding district court orders "final" for purposes of review
under section 1291. 5 It is submitted that, in its zeal to protect the circuit
from an overcrowded docket and to protect litigants from prohibitive costs
and delays in speedy justice by narrowly construing section 1291,6 the Third
Circuit has actually precipitated delays, 7 created the threat of prohibitive
costs, 8 and failed to substantially alleviate its own crowded docket. 9 The
1. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); McKane v. Durston, 153
U.S. 684, 687-89 (1894).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
3. See McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661 (1891). For a discussion of McLish and the requirement of finality under the common law, see notes 29-30 and accompanying text infra. See also
Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1976).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). Section 1291 provides: "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States [and of
associated territories] except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Id.
(emphasis added).
5. Compare Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1347 (3d Cir. 1978) and Bachowski v.
Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1976) with Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S.
148, 152-53 (1964) and Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). In
Bachowski, the Third Circuit stated that an expansion of finality is not proper "in view of our
circuit's disinclination to expand the class of appealable final orders." 545 F.2d at 371.
6. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1347 (3d Cir. 1978); id. at 1357 (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting); Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 367-71 (3d Cir. 1976).
7. See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1352-57 (3d Cir. 1978) (Gibbons, J.,
dissenting); Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 245-47 (3d Cir. 1977) (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
8. See Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 628 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
9. See Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 240-44 (3d Cir. 1977). One danger sought to be
avoided by denying piecemeal review, thereby justifying a restrictive approach to § 1291, is the
overcrowding of appellate dockets. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 368, 373 (3d Cir.
1976); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 623 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925
(1972).
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impact of the Third Circuit's narrow approach is accentuated by the fact
that, since finality is the easiest and clearest basis for appeal, litigants in
federal courts most often initially assert section 1291 as the jurisdictional
ground for their appeals.' 0 This comment's historical review of the finality
requirement will suggest that, for purposes of appeal, the courts of appeals
should be less restrictive than the Third Circuit has been in defining "final
decisions" under section 1291.11
Finality is also required for appeals from the highest court of a state to
12
the United States Supreme Court under section 1257 of the Judicial Code.
13
Although the language and scope of sections 1257 and 1291 differ, the
language and case law interpreting these sections are often used interchangeably, thus confusing the statutory meaning of a "final decision" under
section 1291.14 This comment will trace the roots of this confusion and dis5
cuss its implications in the finality analysis.'
Also influencing the courts' definition of final decisions under section
1291 is the method of analysis used in assessing finality. The Third Circuit
has developed a restrictive approach in determining whether a final decision
has been rendered. 16 In contrast, the Supreme Court has invoked a more
practical approach to the issue. 17 This comment will discuss the consequences of this difference and evaluate the analytical soundness of each approach. 8
In addition to the "final judgment" route, section 1292(a)(1) of the Ju9
dicial Code sets forth a second, frequently used avenue of appeal.1 Under
section 1292(a)(1), an appeal may be taken from an interlocutory district
court order "granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunc-

10. See, e.g., Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1346 (3d Cir. 1978); Brace v. O'Neill,
567 F.2d 237, 239 (3d Cir. 1977).
11. See notes 27-74 and accompanying text infra.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976). For a discussion of the critical distinction between § 1257 and
§ 1291, see notes 75-88 and accompanying text infra.
13. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) with id. § 1291. Section 1257 provides that the Supreme Court may review certain "[flinal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of
a State." Id. § 1257. For the text of § 1291, see note 4 supra.
7
14. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 478 & n. (1975); Cobbledick
F.2d 1340, 1356 &
587
v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324-26 (1940); Hoots v. Pennsylvania,
n.1l (3d Cir. 1978) (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 366 & n.14,
8
368 & n.2 , 369 & nn.33 & 35 (3d Cir. 1976).
15. See notes 75-88 and accompanying text infra.
16. See Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 1977) (Rosenn, J., dissenting). For a
discussion of the Third Circuit's technical construction of § 1291 in Brace, see notes 128-32 &
145-65 and accompanying text infra.
17. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977); Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507,
511 (1950); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
18. See notes 38-74 and accompanying text infra.
19. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1346 (3d Cir. 1978). The Hoots court noted
that the "jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is normally confined to the review of final orders,
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976), or to the classes of interlocutory orders described in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)
(1976)." Id. (footnotes omitted).
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tions or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct
review may be had in the Supreme Court." 20 In contrast to their divergent
application of section 1291, both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit
have adopted a restrictive approach in reviewing the use of section
1292(a)(1). 21 In addition, although rarely invoked, other avenues are available for appeals in the federal courts. Because of the equally restrictive approaches taken by the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit with respect to
these avenues and with respect to section 1292(a)(1), only a brief overview of
22
their application will be presented.
II.

IDENTIFYING A FINAL DECISION UNDER SECTION
OF THE JUDICIAL CODE

1291

A. Background
Section 1291 grants jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to review "final
decisions of the district courts of the United States. " 23 While the finality
requirement of section 1291 applies to different substantive areas of the
law-including civil 24 and criminal appeals 2S5 -the threshold question in
each case is whether a final decision has been rendered by the district
court. 26

As early as the Judiciary Act of 1789,27 the federal appellate courts had

20. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
21. See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978); Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 US. 176, 181 (1955); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d
1340, 1348 n.42 (3d Cir. 1978).
22. For a discussion of the remaining avenues of appeal, see notes 177-215 and accompanying text infra.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). It should be noted that, under the language of § 1291, no
distinction is made between criminal and civil appeals. See id. The courts, however, have emphasized that the "final decision" requirement is of particular importance in criminal prosecutions. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-54 (1978); Abney v. United States,
431 U.S. 651, 657 (1977); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 126 (1962); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1940); United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 118 (3d
Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the rationale behind this emphasis, see notes 114-27 and accompanying text infra.
24. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. Fraternal Ass'n of Steel Haulers, 601 F.2d 1269
(3d Cir. 1979); Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203 (3d Cir. 1979); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v.
General Elec. Co., 597 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam), vacated and remanded, 100 S. Ct.
1460 (1980); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1978).
25. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 804, 806 (3d Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1979); In re
Grand Jury Empanelled (Colucci), 597 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 1979).
26. See, e.g., United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 117-18 (3d Cir. 1979); Forsyth v.
Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1207 (3d Cir. 1979); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1346
(3d Cir. 1978); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Hamilton, 475 F.2d 529, 530-31 (3d Cir.
1973).
27. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, oh. 20, §§ 21-22, 25, 1 Stat. 83, 83-87 (1789) (current version at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1291 (1976)). Section 21 provided that "from final decrees in a district court
in causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, . .. an appeal shall be allowed to the next
circuit court." Id. § 21. Section 22 provided that "final decrees and judgments in civil actions in
a district court ....
may be re-examined, and reversed or affirmed in a circuit court . . . upon a
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jurisdiction only over final dispositions of the trial courts. 28 The statutory
requirement of finality reflected the prior common law 29 which had apparently developed without an explicit rationale. 30 This early finality restriction was expressed by the statute in terms of "final decrees" and "final
judgments" 31 -language which has been adopted in current provisions.3 2
Section 1291, however, is unique in requiring strictly final "decisions". 33
As acknowledged by the Supreme Court, section 1291 codifies the "firm
congressional policy against interlocutory or piecemeal appeals." 34 By forcing the "combin[ation] in one review [of] all the stages of the proceeding
that effectively may be reviewed and corrected if and when final judgment
results," 35 the finality requirement precludes the delay and excessive costs
writ of error." Id. § 22. Finally, § 25 provided that "a final judgment or decree in any suit, in
the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be had, . . .
may be re-examined and reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court of the United States upon
a writ of error." Id. § 25. For a discussion of the early development of the finality doctrine, see
15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3906 (1976);
Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 548-51 (1932).
28. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 21-22, 25, 1 Stat. 83, 83-87 (1789) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976)). For an excellent discussion of the development of finality prior to
its application in the United States, see Crick, supra note 27, at 540-48.
29. See McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665 (1891). The McLish Court, reading a finality
requirement into a statute authorizing writs of error to be taken to the Supreme Court, noted
that "[alt common law no writ of error could be brought except on a final judgment." Id. Thus,
the McLish Court observed that the statutory limitation of the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to final judgments or decrees "was only declaratory of a well settled and ancient
rule of English practice" based upon writs of error. Id.
30. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 368 (3d Cir. 1976). See also Carrington, The
Power of District Judges and the Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507, 509
(1969); Crick, supra note 27, at 549 & n.48; Redish, The Pragmatic Approach to Appealability
in the Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 89, 89 (1975); Warren, New Light on the History of
the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REv. 49, 49, 101-05 (1923). In analyzing the
1789 Judiciary Act, it has been observed that "[w]hy the statute so limited appeals must remain
somewhat of a mystery." Crick, supra, at 549 n.1.
31. See Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§21-22, 25, 1 Stat. 83, 83-87 (1789) (current version
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1291 (1976)). For the pertinent text of §§ 21-22 and 25, see note 27
supra.
32. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1257, 1258 (1976). For the pertinent text of § 1257, see note 13 supra.
33. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). For a dicussion of this distinction, see, e.g., United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); Cobbledick v. United States, 309
U.S. 323, 324 (1940); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 604 F.2d 804, 807 (3d Cir.
1979) (per curiam); In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir.
1979); Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 366 (3d Cir. 1976); Good Deal Supermarkets, Inc. v.
Great Am. Ins. Co., 528 F.2d 710, 712 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v. Estate of Pearce, 498
F.2d 847, 849 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). See also 9 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.06 (2d
ed. 1978); Crick, supra note 27, at 852.
34. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 471 (1978); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 (1974). It is likely
that the courts would have created rules against piecemeal appeals even absent a congressional
mandate to do so. See McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66 (1891) (policy of avoiding repeated
appeals in the same suit is one at the "very foundation of our judicial system"). See also Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 178 (1955).
35. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). The Cohen Court
further noted that the effect of the finality requirement "is to disallow appeal from any decision
which is tentative, informal or incomplete." Id. See also Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 468 (1978).
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occasioned by unrestricted intermediate appeals. 36 The obstruction of just
claims is similarly avoided by prohibiting disruptive separate appeals de37
signed to deliberately harass and create further expense.
Despite the fact that the issue of finality has been extensively litigated 38
and despite the clear articulation in the case law of the modern purposes of,
and underlying policy reasons behind, the requirement of finality under section 1291, the courts have been'unable to clearly express what constitutes a
final decision .3 9 The Supreme Court has, however, adopted an analytical
approach to deciding whether the finality requirement has been met which
utilizes a "practical rather than a technical construction" of section 1291.40
Enunciating this standard in Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp. ,41
the Court required the balancing of the cost and inconvenience of piecemeal
42
review against the danger of a denial of justice caused by delay.
43
Applying the Dickinson test in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,
the Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's resolution of the merits of
plaintiff's several causes of action after all but one of the claims had been

36. See Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
37. See Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). The Cobbledick Court
reasoned that the finality requirements of § 1291 were supported by the fact that "the right to a
judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of
justice." Id. See also Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977).
38. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170 n.9 (1974); McCourkey v. Toledo
& Ohio Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 544-45 (1892). As early as 1892, the McGourkey Court noted
that "[p]robably no question of equity practice has been the subject of more frequent discussion
in this court than the finality of decrees. It has usually arisen upon appeals taken from decrees
claimed to be interlocutory." 146 U.S. at 544-45. See also Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion
Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950).
39. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170-71 (1974); Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 152 (1964); Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp.,
338 U.S. 507, 508 (1950); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949);
McGourkey v. Toledo & Ohio Cent. Ry., 146 U.S. 536, 544-45 (1892); Bachowski v. Usery, 545
F.2d 363, 368-71 (3d Cir. 1976). Compare Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1346-48 (3d
Cir. 1978) with id.at 1352-57 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
Perhaps the best summary of the problems encountered in attempting to define finality was
offered by Justice Powell who stated: "While the application of § 1291 in most cases is plain
enough, determining the finality of a particular judicial order may pose a close question. No
verbal formula vet devised can explain prior finality decisions with unerring accuracy or provide
an utterly reliable guide for the future." Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. at 170 (footnote
omitted). Compare Redish, supra note 30, at 90-92 and Comment, Requiem for the Final
Judgment Rule, 45 TEX. L. REV. 292, 295-98 (1966) with Note, Appealability in the Federal
Courts, 75 HARv. L. REV. 351, 353-67 (1961).
40. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949). See, e.g., Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658 (1977) Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148,
152 (1964). See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 171 (1974); Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S.
323, 326 (1940).
41. 338 U.S. 507 (1950).
42. Id.at511.
43. 379 U.S. 148, 152-53 (1964).
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stricken from the complaint by the district court. 44 In finding the order to
strike final for purposes of section 1291, 4 5 the Gillespie Court concluded that
the Sixth Circuit was correct in determining that the inconvenience and cost
of piecemeal review were outweighed by the danger of denying justice by
delay. 46 The Court reasoned that, because the Sixth Circuit had already
ruled on the issue of whether federal law excluded other means of recovery,
as well as on the issue of whether excluded relatives could also recover, the
inconvenience and cost of remanding the case to the district court without
deciding these issues would be prohibitive. 47 Because the excluded claimants would suffer a delay of "perhaps a number of years" if they had to wait
to appeal until the district court had disposed of the remaining claim on its
merits, the Court reasoned that a denial of immediate appeal "might work a
great injustice." 48 Lastly, although the excluded parties' claims were not
formally severable from the plaintiff's claims, 49 the Court acknowledged
50
that, practically, the claims could be viewed as severable.

44. Id. at 158. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1963),
aff'd, 379 U.S. 148 (1964). The Sixth Circuit granted plaintiff's appeal from a district court order
striking all references pertaining to the doctrine of unseaworthiness, allOhio wrongful death
statute, and an Ohio survival statute from plaintiff's complaint. 321 F.2d at 520. The court of
appeals then concluded that plaintiff's right of recovery, as administratrix of the decedent's
estate, rested solely on the Jones Act. id. at 530. The Sixth Circuit also dismissed plaintiff's
claim for damages resulting from decedent's pain and suffering prior to his death. Id. at 523.
The Supreme Court, balancing the "most important competing considerations," found that,
under the circumstances, the danger of injustice caused by delaying the appeal until the district
court decided the merits of plaintiff's remaining cause of action outweighed the cost and inconvenience of piecemeal review. 379 U.S. at 152-53. The Court also concluded that the issue of
decedent's pain and suffering should remain open, rather than allowing the Sixth Circuit to
decide this issue on the basis of the pleadings alone. Id. at 158.
45. 379 U.S. at 152-54. Plaintiffs petitioned the Sixth Circuit for a writ of mandamus ordering the district court judge to vacate the order to strike. Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,
321 F.2d 518, 520 (6th Cir. 1963), affd, 379 U.S. 148 (1964). Alternatively, petitioners sought
an appropriate written statement from the district judge certifying that an immediate appeal was
appropriate under 28 U S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). 321 F.2d at 520. The Sixth Circuit denied extraordinary relief after deciding the merits of the case against the petitioners. Id. at 532. For a
discussion of § 1292(b) and mandamus, see notes 195-206 and accompanying text inlfra.
46. 379 U.S. at 153. The Gillespie Court did note, however, that the Sixth Circuit's review
of the district court's order to strike could be called "piecemeal". Id.
47. Id. The Gillespie Court's practical approach may be described as a review of the decision of the lower court in light of the present position of the parties. See id. Applying this
analysis to the facts of Gillespie, it was obvious, especially tinder the Dickinson balancing test,
that once the court of appeals had considered the appealability issue, it would be an extreme
waste of time and money, both to the litigants and to the courts, to remand the case to the
district court without deciding the merits. See id.
48. Id.
49. Id. The Gillespie Court concluded that, had the claims been formally severable, the
court's order would be "unquestionably appealable" as to those claims. Id., citing Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950) (order granting part of intervenor's relief and
dismissing intervenor's other claims, while retaining jurisdiction over other parties, deemed
final).
50. See 379 U.S. at 153. The Court noted that the excluded relatives were separate parties
in the petition for extraordinary relief. Id. As separate parties, the excluded claimants could
suffer great hardship if their appeal seeking a determination of the validity of their cause of
action was denied. See id. See also Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 321 F.2d 518, 522

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss6/2

6

Rome: Federal Practice and Procedure - Comment - Appealability and Fina
VILLANOVA

]LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

25: p. 884

The Third Circuit, however, has maintained that a judicial expansion of
the statutory notion of finality will not "serve the goal of speedy justice." 51
According to the Third Circuit, a broad interpretation of finality leads to
piecemeal appeals and the resulting costs and inefficiency are dispositive of
the issue. 52 Although the Third Circuit has generally avoided the
Dickinson-Gillespie practical approach to finality, recent dissenting opinions
from the court seem to reflect internal disagreement 5 3 and an inclination on
the part of several judges toward a practical test of some sort. 54
Dissenting in Hacket v. General Host Corp., 55 Judge Rosenn would
have found an order denying class action certification appealable because the
order "effectively terminate[d] the litigation." 56 Section 1291, he argued,
(6th Cir. 1963), aff'd, 379 U.S. 148 (1964). If the Jones Act were to exclude all other remedies,
and the excluded relatives were properly dismissed, only the plaintiff could recover damages.
379 U.S. at 150-51. Practically, therefore, the excluded relatives' claims could be viewed as
severable and "fundamental to the further conduct of the case." Id. at 153, quoting United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 377 (1945).
51. Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1347 (3d Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted). See also
In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1239 (3d Cir. 1979) (Aldisert, J.,
dissenting) (denial of motion to quash grand jury subpoena not immediately appealable);
Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 373 (3d Cir. 1976) (order to recount union election ballots
not final); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 624 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 407 U.S.
925 (1972) (order denying confirmation of class action not final); Borden v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843,
845-46 (3d Cir. 1969) (order compelling plaintiff to answer deposition questions over his relevancy objection not final).
52. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1976); Borden v. Sylk, 410 F.2d
843, 846 (3d Cir. 1969). In concluding that the Third Circuit should suppress the urge to rule
on the merits of such cases, the Bachowski court noted:
The appellate system has become increasingly overburdened and the future would appear
to promise no relief from the continuous increase in case loads. Accordingly, it would
seem to us to be a disservice to the Court, to litigants in general and to the idea of
speedy justice if we were to succumb to enticing suggestions to abandon the deeply-held
distaste for piece-meal litigation in every instance of temptation.
545 F.2d at 373. See generally M. GREEN, BASIC CIVIL PROCEDURE 231-32 (1972); 15 C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 3907; Crick, supra note 27, at 548-54,
563-65; Redish, supra note 30, at 89; Comment, supra note 39, at 292-93; Note, supra note 39,
at 351-53.
53. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d 1340, 1356-57 (3d Cir. 1978) (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618, 626-31 (3d Cir.), (Rosenn, J., dissenting),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
54. Compare United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1979) (order denying
exclusion of press from sentencing not final) and Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 243 (3d Cir.
1977) (stay order not final absent extraordinary circumstances) with Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599
F.2d 1203, 1207 (3d Cir. 1979) (order denying motion for summary judgment on issue of absolute immunity deemed final) and Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting)
(order dismissing claims without prejudice, irrespective of conflicting court opinions, should be
deemed final). This uncertainty, it is submitted, can be attributed to misapplication of the
Dickinson-Gillespie test. See notes 40-50 and accompanying text supra.
55. 455 F.2d 618, 626 (3d Cir.) (Rosenn, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972).
56. 455 F.2d at 628 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Alternatively the dissent would have deemed
the order final under the collateral order doctrine because the issue of class certification was
separable from the merits of the case and the denial of review might cause the loss of an
important right. See id. at 627 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). The dissent noted, however, that, because denying class certification may effectively decide the merits of the case by ending the
litigation, a practical approach to finality would be more appropriate than the collateral order
doctrine. See id. at 629 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the collateral order doctrine, see notes 89-113 and accompanying text infra. See also Coppers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 467-69 (1978) (collateral order doctrine inapplicable to order denying class certification).

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

7

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 6 [1980], Art. 2

1979-1980]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

requires a Dickinson-Gillespie balancing of the consequences of allowing or
disallowing the appeal. 57 It is submitted that, having considered the collateral nature of the class certification order and the collateral order doctrine
separately from the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing approach,5 8 Judge Rosenn
enunciated a "pure" section 1291 balancing approach for cases beyond the
ambit of the collateral order doctrine. 59
Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in Hoots v. Pennsylvania,60 Judge
Gibbons would have deemed final the district court's denial of the state's
motion for approval of its school reorganization plan.61 Rather than using a
"pure" Dickinson-Gillespie balancing approach, Judge Gibbons argued
that,
in effect, the district court's order insurmountably obstructed appropriate

57. 455 F.2d at 629 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court recently held, in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 464-65 (1978), that a denial of class action certification is not a final decision under § 1291, Judge Rosenn's opinion is noteworthy in that it
illustrates an attempted application of the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing test. See 455 F.2d at
628-31 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn's finding of finality can be seen as resting on two
alternative grounds: 1) the "death knell" doctrine which was explicitly repudiated with respect
to class certification orders in Coopers & Lybrand; and 2) the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing
test. See id. (stating that under "either the Dickinson-Gillespie doctrine or under [the death
knell doctrine,] plaintiff has properly brought her appeal before this court").
According to the Coopers & Lybrand Court, the "death knell" doctrine assumed "that
without the incentive of a possible group recovery, the individual plaintiff may find it economically imprudent to pursue his lawsuit to a final judgment and then seek appellate review of an
adverse class determination." 437 U.S. at 469-70. Due to this sounding of the "death knell" of
the litigation, the doctrine had held such orders final. See id. at 469. It is submitted that the
Coopers & Lybrand Court, in limiting Gillespie to its facts, did not overrule the DickinsonGillespie balancing test. See id. at 477 n.30. Consequently, although Judge Rosenn's finding of
finality was subsequently discredited, it is suggested that his alternative balancing approach
remains viable.
Arguably, Judge Rosenn's reasoning in Hackett was that the "death knell" doctrine itself
satisfied the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing test in that the cost and inconvenience of piecemeal
review outweighed the danger of a denial of justice due to the effective termination of the
litigation. See 455 F.2d at 630 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (simplifying the "death knell" doctrine to
the issue of whether the single claim seeks enough money to continue the case is "far removed
from the original balancing of the inconvenience of piecemeal litigation"). Again, although his
conclusion as to the class certification order does not survive Coopers & Lybrand, it is important to note that Judge Rosenn's balancing approach has not been explicitly overruled. See
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 477 & n.30. For a discussion of the viability of the
Dickinson-Gillespietest in light of Coopers & Lybrand, see notes 69-74 and accompanying text
infra. For a discussion of the "death knell" doctrine, see generally 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER
& E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 3912.
58. See 455 F.2d at 627-29 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
59. See id. at 628-31 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the virtue of a pure § 1291
analysis, see notes 68-74 and accompanying text infra.
60. 587 F.2d 1340, 1351 (3d Cir. 1978) (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 1352 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). The district court had denied approval of the plan
because of a lack of evidence of broad community support, the failure of the community to
devise its own plan, the effect of busing non-white children into unfamiliar grounds, the traffic
problems emanating from busing, and loss of community control. Id. Denial of the plan prolonged the de jure segregation which had been found to have existed five years before the
present appeal. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807, 824 (W.D.Pa. 1973), affJd, 587
F.2d 1340 (3d Cir. 1978). Plaintiffs had brought suit seven years before the present appeal was
taken. 587 F.2d at 1352 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
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relief62 and would result in further, unreasonable delay.6a Although Judge
Gibbons did not invoke the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing test, 64 he apparently did utilize a practical approach, emphasizing the cost and inconvenience caused by delay of the litigation 65 and asking whether the order "has
the effect of denying all relief for a violation of a constitutional right." 66
While arguably based upon legitimate concerns of judicial policy, it is
submitted that the Third Circuit's stance against expanding finality does not
begin to clarify or define which decisions are final under section 1291 and,
consequently, it is of little help to the lower courts. 67 In order to provide a
clear and workable standard of finality, it is suggested that the Third Circuit
should adopt the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing test in order to decide
whether a district court's order is final. 68 By using such a "pure" section
1291 balancing approach, 69 the Third Circuit would conform with the appar70
ent mandate of the Supreme Court.
62. 587 F.2d at 1354 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons contended that, not only had
seven years passed since suit was brought, thus denying many plaintiffs meaningful relief for
their children, but also, by relieving the state of its obligation to present a plan for desegregation, the trial court's order had effectively precluded relief. See id. at 1352-55 & n,7 (Gibbons,
J., dissenting) (defendant state agencies, rather than "victims," have the technical and financial
resources to desegregate school district).
63. See id. at 1355 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Judge Gibbons observed that, even if plaintiffs
could devise an acceptable plan, it would take at least two more years of litigation before the
plan could he approved. Id.
64. See id. at 1351-57 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the Dickinson-Gillespie
balancing test, see notes 40-50 and accompanying text supra.
65. See 587 F.2d at 1352, 1355-57 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
66. Id. at 1352 (Gibbons, J., dissenting). Similarly, according to the dissent, orders resulting
in irremediable injury caused by stays for indefinite periods of time would be deemed final, and
appealable, under § 1291. Id. at 1356 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
67. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d at 1347; Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 371
(3d Cir. 1976). The Bachowski court concluded that an expansion of finality is not proper "in
view of our circuit's disinclination to expand the class of appealable final orders." 545 F.2d at
373.
68. See Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d at 629 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). See also
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 152-54.
69. It should be noted that the "pure" § 1291 balancing approach is distinct from the collateral order doctrine. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the
collateral order doctrine with respect to § 1291 analysis, see notes 89-101 and accompanying text
infra.
70. Compare Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 152-54 with Bachowski v.
Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 370-71 (3d Cir. 1976). In Bachowski, the Third Circuit justified its decision to forego the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing approach by noting the lack of clear guidance
from the Supreme Court on matters of appealability. 545 F.2d at 370. The Bachowski court
observed that Gillespie has been interpreted restrictively. Id., citing United States v. Estate of
Pearce, 498 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1974); Bradley v. Milliken, 468 F.2d 902 (6th Cir. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27,

§ 3913, at 534-35 (1976); Redish, supra note 30, at 120-21. The Bachowski court, however,
could not cite a Supreme Court case limiting Gillespie. See 545 F.2d at 370 n.44.
Although the Supreme Court has subsequently limited Gillespie to its "unique facts," it
cannot be said to have abandoned the balancing test approach. See Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978). Significantly, the "unique facts" of Gillespie centered
upon the fact that the substantive issues had already been decided by the court of appeals,
which mitigated against the cost and inconvenience of piecemeal review. See id. See also note
47 and accompanying text supra. Certainly, more guidance concerning appealability survives
from this apparent application of the balancing test than the particular decision that, after the

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

9

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 6 [1980], Art. 2

1979-1980]

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

The Dickinson-Gillespie balancing approach, devised in light of section

1291's purpose of avoiding piecemeal review, 71 can hardly be said to have
been designed to negate the finality requirement or to sanction uncontrolled
piecemeal review. 72 Furthermore, in light of the fact that the danger of
piecemeal review has never been considered to be an absolute barrier to
granting an appeal, 73 it would seem that appeals from orders where the
danger of denying justice as a result of delay outweighs the cost and inconvenience of piecemeal review should be permitted as a matter of fairness to
litigants. 74 Since the concept of justice necessitates a fair and timely oppor-

tunity for litigants to settle disputes, appeals from orders endangering this
opportunity must be considered.
The attempt to define a "final decision" under section 1291 suffers not

only from differences in approach toward appealability 7 5 but also from
analytical imprecision. Part of this confusion has resulted from the failure of
both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit to distinguish section 1291

from section 1257 of the Judicial Code which grants federal appellate jurisdiction over state Supreme Court decisions. 76 Under section 1257, the
United States Supreme Court may review certain "[f]inal judgments or de-

fact, an order may be considered appealable because the court of appeals has already decided
the merits of the case. If this were not so, then the Dickinson-Gillespie test would be rendered
meaningless in terms of its initial purpose of avoiding the danger of piecemeal review by requiring the courts of appeal to decide first whether an appeal should be permitted and then, if the
appeal is taken, whether petitioners should prevail on the merits. Furthermore, the Coopers &
Lybrand Court technically found only that Gillespie did not support appealability as a matter of
right and did not restrict use of the Gillespie approach in arguing for appealability. See 437 U.S.
at 477 n.30.
The Third Circuit has, after Coopers & Lybrand, emphasized the need for a practical
construction of § 1291. See Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1207 (3d Cir. 1979) (citing
the Coopers & Lybrand test for the collateral order exception). Albeit a collateral order case,
Forsyth at least implicitly recognized that the Supreme Court has not abandoned a practical test
in determining finality under § 1291. Id. Moreover, Dickinson, in which the cost and inconvenience versus delay balancing test was first enunciated, has never been explicitly repudiated.
To the contrary, the Coopers & Lybrand Court arguably upheld the balancing test implicitly by
recognizing that an appeal should be taken, as in Gillespie, where "none of the policies of
judicial economy served by the finality requirement would be achieved were the case sent back
with the important issue[s] undecided." 437 U.S. at 477 n.30. It is submitted that, in light of
the continued viability of the balancing test, the Bachowski court should have distinguished
between the balancing test and the collateral order doctrine and determined whether application of the balancing test resulted in appealability. See 545 F.2d at 370.
71. See Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 152-53.
72. See id. at 153.
73. See, e.g., id.; Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d 237, 239 & n.5 (3d Cir. 1977); Bachowski v.
Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 367 (3d Cir. 1976).
74. See, e.g., Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 152-54; Dickinson v.
Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. at 510-12.
75. For a discussion of the disagreement that has resulted from the Third Circuit's use of a
restrictive approach to finality under § 1291, see notes 51-66 and accompanying text supra.
76. See generally Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 502-05 (1975) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting). The requirement of a final judgment in order for the United States Supreme
Court to have jurisdiction over a state Supreme Court decision had its statutory origin in the
Judiciary Act of 1789. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 3908.
For a discussion of the Judiciary Act of 1789, see notes 27-31 and accompanying text supra.
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crees rendered by the highest court of a State." 77 Dissimilarly, section 1291
authorizes review of "final decisions" from lower federal courts. 78 Besides
failing to acknowledge this difference in language, 79 the courts have also
failed to distinguish the differences in the postures of such appeals. 80
Appeals under section 1291 do not affect federal-state relations, as do
those under section 1257,81 and are regulated simply to effect "efficient administration." 8 2 Federal review of state decisions, however, must not only
discourage piecemeal review, but must also ensure comity and avoid intrusion into local matters which the states are capable of resolving themselves. 83 Unnecessary infringement upon the state courts by the federal
courts would disrupt both "the smooth working of our federal system," 84
and the state systems as well. 8 5
77. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
78. Id. § 1291 (emphasis supplied). For the text of § 1291, see note 4 supra.
79. See, e.g., Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); Cobbledick v.
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325-26 (1940); United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 118 (3d
Cir. 1979); Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 368-71 (3d Cir. 1976). But see United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 853-55 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657-59 (1977).
Yet even in MacDonald and Abney, where a possible distinction was noted, the Court continued to refer to final judgments and the final judgment rule in regard to § 1291 finality. See
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 853-55; Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 657-59.
80. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 502 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., National Socialist Party of America v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977) (per
curiam); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. at 478 & n.7; Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d at 1356 & n.ll (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 366 n.14, 368 & n.28, 369 & nn.33 & 35 (3d Cir.
1976). It has been suggested that the analyses used in cases decided under §§ 1291 and 1257
should not be used indiscriminately unless simply mentioned with regard to the historical purposes and rationale behind the requirement of finality. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. at 502-05 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). With respect to the Third Circuit, it is submitted
that the Bachowski court's failure to differentiate between §§ 1291 and 1257 not only tainted
that court's lengthy summation of the history and purpose of § 1291, but also arguably formed
an incorrect basis for the Third Circuit's later reliance upon Bachowski in declining to expand §
1291. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d at 367-71. See also Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d at
1347 & nn.35 & 36; In re W.F. Breuss, Inc., 586 F.2d 983, 990 n.17 (3d Cir. 1978) (Adams, J.,
dissenting); Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 543 & nn.9-10 (3d Cir. 1977).
81. See 15 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 27, § 3908. Because cases
brought under § 1291 are brought from a federal district court to a federal court of appeals, they
do not involve such issues as independent and adequate state grounds, comity, or other relevant
concerns uniquely related to our system of federalism and the coexistence of federal and state
courts. See Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 502-05 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For the pertinent language of § 1257, see note 13 supra.
82. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 505 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
83. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 792-93 (1969); Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S.
392, 400-01 (1963); Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67 (1948); Radio
Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945).
84. Radio Station WOW, Inc. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945).
85. See id. See also Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 42-45 (1971). Although Younger did not
deal with § 1257 in addressing the narrow issue of whether a state criminal prosecution should
be enjoined, the Court's language pertaining to the importance of a smooth working state and
federal system is highly relevant. The Younger court stated:
This underlying reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of "comity," that
is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is
made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1980

11

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 6 [1980], Art. 2

1979-1980)

THIRD CIRCUIT REVIEW

In light of the absence of federal-state tension in section 1291 appeals, it
is submitted that section 1291 need not be as strictly construed as section
1257. In rigidly construing section 1291 by confusing sections 1291 and
1257,86 and in using cases applying section 1257 to support decisions concerning section 1291 appeals, 87 the courts risk denying more appeals than
are necessary to achieve the purposes of section 1291. This is so because
courts may refuse to take an appeal under section 1291, not only due to the
danger of piecemeal review, but also, unwittingly, due to reasons relating to
comity, state rights, and federalism which are involved in section 1257 decisions. It is therefore submitted that the first step toward a clear and consistent approach to finality under section 1291 is a separate analysis of the two
jurisdictional statutes and a discontinuance of the use of section 1257 cases to
support decisions applying section 1291.88
B. The Collateral Order Doctrine: Finality in a Different Form
Orders, "final in [their] nature as to . . . matter[s] distinct from the
general subject of litigation and affecting only the parties to the particular
controversy" 89 have generally been found to satisfy the section 1291 finality
requirement. 90 The seminal case for allowing appeals of orders collateral to
the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to
perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better
and clear way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism" .
The
concept does not mean blind deference to "States' Rights" ....
What the concept does
represent is a system in which there is sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State
and National Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious though it
may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal interests, always endeavors to
do so in ways that will not unduly interfere with the legitimate activities of the States.
Id. at 44.
86. See note 79-80 and accompanying text supra.
87. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 366 n.14, 368 & n.28, 369 & nn.33 & 35 (3d
Cir. 1976).
88. See, e.g., Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 660 (1977); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587
F.2d at 1356 & n.ll (Gibbons, J., dissenting); Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 366 n.14, 368
& n.28, 369 & nn.33 & 35 (3d Cir. 1976).
89. United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 414 (1926). See also
Arnold v. Guimarin & Co., 263 U.S. 427, 432-33, 434 (1923) (finality denied where court of
appeals decided amount due plaintiff but remanded for further proceedings concerning the
claims of intervening creditors); Collins v. Miller, 252 U.S. 364, 370-71 (1920) (district court
order denying habeas corpus relief as to one charge, but ordering further hearings on other
charges, lacks finality and completeness); Williams v. Morgan, 111 U.S. 684, 699 (1884) (decree
from court of appeals which ordered foreclosure and fixed compensation is final as to that
matter).
90. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978); United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 854 (1978); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 657-59 (1977). It is
unclear whether the Court intended the collateral order doctrine to be an exception to § 1291
since it has suggested that collateral orders are in fact final under § 1291. See Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 468; United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 854; Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. at 657-59 (1979); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170-72
(1974); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949).
It is also unclear whether the collateral order doctrine simply falls within the DickinsonGillespie balancing approach in light of the great danger of injustice caused by waiting until final
disposition of the entire case before allowing appeal of collateral orders. For a discussion of the
Dickinson -Gllespie balancing approach, see notes 40-50 and accompanying text supra.
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the general controversy is Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp. 91 In
Cohen, the Supreme Court, one year before deciding Dickinson,92 construed finality liberally by applying a "practical rather than a technical construction to section 1291." 93 The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting in diversity, had denied defendant's motion to
require plaintiff to post security as required under New Jersey law. 9 4 Although noting that similar cases may arise infrequently, 95 the Cohen Court
allowed the appeal, holding that the order denying security was appealable
because it was "a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingre96
dient of the cause of action and does not require consideration with it."
In Abney v. United States, 97 the Supreme Court clearly set forth the
requirements for determing whether an order is collateral, and therefore
appealable, under Cohen. 98 First, the district court's order must be found
to have "conclusively determine[d] the disputed question." 99 Second, the
court of appeals must determine that the district court's "decision was not
simply a 'step toward final disposition of the merits of the case [which

91. 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
92. For a discussion of Dickinson, see notes 41-42 and accompanying text supra.
93. 337 U.S. at 548.
94. Id. at 543-44. Plaintiff had brought a stockholder's derivative action alleging mismanagement and fraud. Id. at 543.
95. Id. at 546. The Cohen Court noted:
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right
separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied
review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be
deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.
id.
96. Id. at 546-47. The Cohen Court did, however, attempt to limit the sweep of its decision:
[W]e do not mean that every order fixing security is subject to appeal. Here it is the right
to security that presents a serious and unsettled question. If the right were admitted or
clear and the order involved only an exercise of discretion as to the amount of security, a
matter the statute makes subject to reconsideration from time to time, appealability would
present a different question.
Id. at 547.
97. 431 U.S. 651 (1977). The Abney Court concluded that "a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds" was final under Cohen. Id. at 659.
98. Id. at 658. See notes 99-101 and accompanying text infra.
99. 431 U.S. at 658. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468-69 (1978), citing
United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978). The order must "in no sense . . . leave
the matter 'open, unfinished or inconclusive.' " 431 U.S. at 658, quoting Cohen v. Beneficial
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546.
Finding the disputed order collateral and, therefore, appealable, the Abney Court
reasoned:
In the first place there can be no doubt that [pretrial orders denying motions to dismiss
an indictment on double jeopardy grounds] constitute a complete, formal, and, in the trial
court, final rejection of a criminal defendant's double jeopardy claim, There are simply no
further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant
maintains is barred by the Fifth Amendment's guarantee. Hence, Cohen's threshold requirement of a fully consummated decision is satisfied.
431 U.S. at 659. See also United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1979); Rodgers
v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 169 (3d Cir. 1975).
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would] be merged in final judgment'; rather, it [must have] resolved an issue
completely collateral to the cause of action asserted." 100 Finally, the court
of appeals must determine that the district court's decision "involved an important right which would be 'lost, probably irreparably,' if the review had
01
to await final judgment." 1
In United States v. MacDonald,10 2 the Supreme Court recently addressed the problem of applying the collateral order doctrine to criminal
cases. 10 3 Utilizing the Cohen test as expressed in Abney, 10 4 the MacDonald
Court concluded that a pretrial order denying defendant's motion to dismiss
an indictment on the ground that his right to a speedy trial had been violated is not appealable. 105 The MacDonald Court emphasized that "the rule

100. 431 U.S. at 658, quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546. The
Abney Court decided that the order denying dismissal of defendant's indictment was purely
collateral:
[T]he very nature of a double jeopardy claim is such that it is collateral to, and separable
from, the principal issue at the accused's impending criminal trial, i.e., whether or not
the accused is guilty of the offense charged. In arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment bars his prosecution, the defendant makes no challenge whatsoever to the merits of the charge against him. Nor does he seek suppression of evidence ....
[T]he matters embraced in the trial court's pretrial order . . . will not "affect,
or . . . be affected by, decision of the merits of this case."
431 U.S. at 659-60, quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546 (footnote
and citations omitted).
101. 431 U.S. at 658, quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546. As to
this final element, the Abney Court reasoned that "the guarantee against double jeopardy assures an individual that, among other things, he will not be forced, with certain exceptions, to
endure the personal strain, public embarrassment, and expense of a criminal trial more than
once for the same offense." 431 U.S. at 661. The Court concluded that "the rights conferred on
a criminal accused by the Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly undermined if appellate review of double jeopardy claims were postponed until after conviction and sentence." Id.
at 660.
102. 435 U.S. 850 (1978).
103. Id. at 853. The MacDonald Court recognized the frequency with which the issue of
appealability of pretrial orders in a criminal case had been decided by the Court. See id., citing
Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962);
Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513 (1956); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
The Supreme Court, in criminal cases, has "twice departed from the general prohibition against
piecemeal appellate review." See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 854, citing Abney v.
United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951). In Stack, the Court
concluded that an order denying a motion to reduce bail was appeable under the collateral
order doctrine. 342 U.S. at 6. For a discussion of Abney, See notes 97-101 and accompanying
text supra.
104. For a discussion of the Cohen-Abney test, see notes 91-101 and accompanying text
supra.
105. 435 U.S. at 857. The Court reasoned that, because speedy trial claims are effectively
asserted after trial and involve facts which are developed at trial, denial of a motion to dismiss
on speedy trial grounds does not represent a complete, formal, and final rejection of defendant's
claim. Id. at 858. The Court also reasoned that, because the question of prejudice to the defense in a speedy trial claim is not divorced from the events at trial, the district court's order
denying a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds was not collateral to the principal issue at
trial-i.e., whether the defendant is innocent or guilty. Id. at 859. Finally, the Court noted
that an order denying dismissal of criminal charges on speedy trial grounds does not involve an
important right which would probably be irreparably lost if an appeal may not be taken before
final disposition because the speedy trial defense involves a right already lost before trial, rather
than a loss occurring at trial. Id. at 860-61.
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of finality has particular force in criminal prosecutions because 'encouragement of delay is fatal to the vindication of the criminal law.' "106
The Cohen case had been decided by the Third Circuit prior to the
Supreme Court's affirmance of that decision. 10 7 In contrast to its current
approach to appealability under section 1291,108 the Third Circuit had defined finality broadly in Cohen and granted .the appeal. 10 9
Since Cohen, however, the Third Circuit's application of the collateral
order doctrine has not been uniform. 110 In several cases, the court has declared that the doctrine should be construed narrowly."' In other cases,
however, the court has applied a practical and, consequently, broader construction of the collateral order rule. 112 The difference in approach is apparently not attributable to the severity of the impact which the decision will
113
have on the party seeking the appeal.

106. Id. at 853-54, quoting Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940). The
Cobbledick Court remarked:
An accused is entitled to scrupulous observance of constitutional safeguards ... Bearing
the discomfiture and cost of a prosecution for crime even by an innocent person is one of
the painful obligations of citizenship. The correctness of a trial court's rejection even of a
constitutional claim made by the accused in the process of prosecution must await his
conviction before its reconsideration by an appellate tribunal.
309 U.S. at 325-26 (citation omitted).
107. See Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948), affd sub noma.
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949).
108. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's present approach to "pure" § 1291 cases, see
notes 51-66 and accompanying text supra.
109. See Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1948), affd sub
nom. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Third Circuit noted that
"[a] 'final decision' is not necessarily the ultimate judgment or decree completely closing up a
proceeding [for] .. . there may be one or more final decisions on particular phases of the
litigation." 170 F.2d at 49, quoting Rubert Hermanos, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 118 F.2d 752, 757
(1st Cir. 1941), rev'd on other grounds, 315 U.S. 637 (1942). Thus, the Third Circuit concluded
that "[t]he words 'final decisions,' like the equivalent 'final judgments and decrees' in former
acts regulating appellate jurisdiction, have not been understood in a strict and technical sense,
but have been given a liberal and reasonable construction." 170 F.2d at 49 (citations omitted).
For a discussion of the facts of Cohen, see notes 91-96 and accompanying text supra.
110. See notes 111-27 and accompanying text infra.
111. See, e.g., United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1979); Bachowski v.
Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 1976); Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152,
159 (3d Cir. 1975); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 358-60 (3d Cir. 1974);
Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d at 621; Borden v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843, 845-46 (3d Cir.
1969).
112. See, e.g., Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1207-08 (3d Cir. 1979); In re Grand
Jury Proceedings (U.S. Steel-Clairton Works), 525 F.2d 151, 155-56 (3d Cir. 1975); Hattersley
v. Bollt, 512 F.2d 209, 215 n.16 (3d Cir. 1975); Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170
F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1948), affd sub nom. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S.
541 (1949).
113. Compare Forsyth v. Kleindienst, 599 F.2d 1203, 1207 (3d Cir. 1979) (collateral order
doctrine satisfied by order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment on issues of absolute and qualified immunity) with Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 360 (3d
Cir. 1974) (collateral order doctrine not satisfied by order decertifying plaintiff class).
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Although having suggested that the finality doctrine should apply with
equal force in civil and criminal cases, 1 14 the Third Circuit has recently
applied the rule of finality with "particular force" in a criminal prosecution. 115 In United States v. Fiumara,l 16 the Third Circuit concluded that a
district court's refusal to ban the public and the press from the defendant's
sentencing was not a final order under the Cohen exception. 117 Publicity,
the court reasoned, would not necessarily deny the defendant the right to a
fair trial118 and the defendant had failed to show, pursuant to Abney, that
"an important right . . . would be lost . . . if review had to await final judgment." 119
Similarly, in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (FMC Corp.), 1 20 albeit
without citation to Cohen, the Third Circuit declared that an order concerning the suppression of evidence is nonappealable because it is "merely a step
in the criminal prosecution." 121 Although, in the grand jury context, there
exists a narrow exception to finality for "orders denying motions for the re-

114. See Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170 F.2d 44, 49 (3d Cir. 1948), affd sub
nom. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Smith, the Third Circuit
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940), and
stated that although the Cobbledick opinion "deals with a criminal appeal, the principle set out
therein is equally applicable to civil causes." 170 F.2d at 49. Arguably, however, the civil and
criminal analyses were to apply interchangeably only with regard to the development of, and
rationale behind, the final decision requirement. See id.
115. United States v. Fiumara, 605 F.2d 116, 118 (3d Cir. 1979), quoting United States v.
MacDonald, 435 U.S. at 853-54. See also Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325
(1940). For an overview of the history of criminal appeals, see Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
at 656-57.
116. 605 F.2d 116 (3d Cir. 1979).
117. Id. at 117.
118. Id. Defendant contended that the sentencing, if made public, would jeopardize his right
to a fair trial in a case pending in a neighboring district. Id.
119. Id. at 118, citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 658. The Fiumara court concluded that the defendant had no constitutional right to a secret trial and that the right to a fair
trial in a subsequent case could be protected by "the usual remedies of voir dire, change of
venue, continuance, and the like." 605 F.2d at 118. Reasoning that finality should be strictly
construed where such other remedies are available, the court held that the collateral order
doctrine should not be invoked. Id.
The Fiumara court also found the defendant's attempt to obtain review under the appellate
court's mandamus power to be inappropriate, reasoning that mandamus should not be used to
review interlocutory orders except in the rarest of circumstances. See id. For a discussion of the
restrictions upon the use of mandamus, see notes 200-06 and accompanying text infra.
120. 604 F.2d 804 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
121. Id. at 807, citing DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962). But see In re Grand
Jury Empanelled (Colucci), 597 F.2d 851, 854-55 (3d Cir. 1979) (order quashing grand jury
subpoena duces tecum held appealable under post-DiBella amendments to the Criminal Appeals Act). For a discussion of the Criminal Appeals Act, see notes 124-27 and accompanying text
infra. Under the Abney analysis, the order in FMC appeared to be a step toward a final decision on the merits so the order would not be deemed to be collateral. See 604 F.2d at 807; note
100 and accompanying text supra. When the grand jury proceedings were resumed, the FMC
court found that the defendant's motion for the return of certain documents was, in essence,
tied to a possible future criminal prosecution. See 604 F.2d at 807.
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turn of property,"1 22 the FMC court concluded that appellant's motion resulted in what was essentially a nonappealable order concerning the suppres123
sion of evidence.
Other recent Third Circuit decisions have found orders appealable
under the Criminal Appeals Act, 124 holding only alternatively that the appeal
was proper under the section 1291 finality provision. 125 Because the Criminal Appeals Act is to be liberally construed, 126 however, this unexplained
alternative grant of appeal under section 1291 does little to indicate what
127
must be established to satisfy the possibly less expansive statute.
C. Illustrating The Third Circuit's Approach to Section 1291
The Third Circuit's decision in Brace v. O'Neill 128 illustrated the continual problems it will face whenever the pure section 1291 balancing test is
not applied 129 and whenever the pure balancing test is not distinguished
from the collateral order doctrine. 130 In failing to apply the proper tests

122. 604 F.2d at 807.
123. Id. FMC had produced several documents in response to a grand jury's subpoena. Id.
at 806. Claiming that the government had improperly sought the documents, FMC moved for
an order requiring the return of the documents. See id. at 806-07. The Third Circuit deemed
the motion to be one for the suppression of evidence because the essential character of the
district court's proceedings left open the possibility that FMC might be subject to further criminal prosecution. Id. at 807.
124. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). For the text of § 3731, see note 126 infra.
125. In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1226 (3d Cir. 1979); In re
Grand Jury Empanelled (Colucci), 597 F.2d 851, 855, 857-58 (3d Cir. 1979).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1976). Section 3731 provides in pertinent part:
An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order
of a district courts [sic] suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of
seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in
jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United
States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of
delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding....
The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.
Id. (emphasis added).
127. So, too, granting an appeal under § 1291 without a proper analysis does little to clarify
what constitutes a final decision. For a discussion of the problems that courts have encountered
in defining "final decisions" under § 1291, see notes 38-39 and accompanying text supra.
128. 567 F.2d 237 (3d Cir. 1977).
129. The Brace majority failed to apply the Dickinson-Gillespiebalancing test. For a discussion of the pure § 1291 balancing test, see notes 40-50 & 68-70 and accompanying text supra.
130. See 567 F.2d at 239 n.5, 243. Although frequent references were made to Cohen,
neither the majority nor the dissent discussed Cohen in terms of finality criteria. Compare id.
at 242-43 with id. at 249-50 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Similarly, Abney, decided three months
earlier, was not cited. The majority did, however, conclude that "the proceedings below remain[ed] 'open,' 'unfinished,' and 'inconclusive.'" Id. at 242, quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546. Because this language parallels the first criterion of Abney, it
could be argued that the majority was applying a collateral order test. For a discussion of the
first criterion of the Abney test, see note 99 and accompanying text supra. Nevertheless, because the majority never indicated that it was applying a collateral order test, it would appear
that the majority cited Cohen for the purpose of applying a practical approach to finality under
§ 1291. See 567 F.2d at 242-43. The end result, therefore, was the creation of an impure
analysis under § 1291 tainted by the use of collateral order considerations. See id.
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under section 1291, the Brace majority, although announcing its intention to
apply a practical approach,' 3' actually applied a restrictive approach to determining finality under section 1291.132
In Brace, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania consolidated the plaintiff's sex discrimination action with a
similar suit brought by the United States Department of Justice, 133 severing
the plaintiff's allegation of specific harassment. 134 Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal without prejudice 135 of her non-severed claims pending a final decision of the consolidated case.1 36 She also appealed the district
court's order entering judgment for the defendants as to her severed
claim. 137
A series of district court pronouncements made it unclear whether the
court had retained jurisdiction over, or dismissed, the plaintiff's non-severed
claims.' 3 8 Having specifically retained jurisdiction over the consolidated
cases 139 and having granted interim relief,1 40 the district court decided the
plaintiff's individual claim of harassment in favor of the defendants.' 4 ' In its

131. See 567 F.2d at 243.
132. See id. at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 240. Plaintiff had charged the Philadelphia Police Department with four counts of
sex discrimination. Id.
134. Id. Counts I, II and IV of plaintiff's complaint alleged broad charges of sex discrimination. id. Count III alleged specific harassment due to defendants' retaliatory conduct in response to plaintiffs charges. Id. Plaintiff neither consented nor objected to consolidation. Id.
135. See id. at 238-43. A "dismissal without prejudice" preserves "the right of the complainant to sue again on the same cause of action [and] [t]he effect of the words 'without prejudice' is
to prevent the decree of dismissal from operating as a bar to a subsequent suit." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONAFtY 421 (5th ed. 1979). Dismissal with prejudice has been defined as "[a]n adjudication
on the merits, and final disposition, barring the right to bring or maintain an action on the same
claim or cause ... [being] res judiciata as to every matter litigated." Id.
136. 567 F.2d at 238-40. On June 4, 1976, the district court ordered that "[a]ll claims raised
by Plaintiff, Penelope Brace in Counts I, II and IV of her complaint alleging discriminatory
employment practices based on sex are dismissed without prejudice pending final decision in
the related [Government civil suit]." Id. at 241, quoting Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339, slip op.
at 1 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1976) (emphasis in original).
137. 567 F.2d at 238, 243-44. The district court had ordered that "[o]n all remaining Counts
.. . [j]udgment is to be entered in favor of the defendants against the plaintiff." Id. at 238,
quoting Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339, slip op. at 1 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1976).
138. See 567 F.2d at 240-44.
139. Id. at 240. On March 5, 1976, the district court ordered that it would
retai[n]jurisdiction in this matter for all purposes. The issues not addressed by this
Order, including the issues of back pay, interest and other emoluments of office, if any,
are deferred until twenty-four months from the date of this Order or until the results of
the aforementioned study are presented to the Court, whichever is shorter.
Id. (emphasis by the Third Circuit), quoting Brace v. O'Neill, Nos. 74-400, 74-339, slip op. at 1
(E.D. Pa. Mar. 5, 1976) (Footnote omitted). See note 140 infra.
140. 567 F.2d at 240. Although the district court ordered a further study of the matter, it
also ordered interim relief, including the hiring and promotion of competent female police officers. Id. The trial judge also ordered defendants to report within twenty-four months on the
progress of these employees. Id.
141. Id. at 241. The district court's ruling was part of a memorandum opinion and order filed
on June 4, 1976. See id. For the text of the relevant portions of the court's order on this date,
see notes 136 & 137 supra.
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memorandum opinion accompanying this decision, the court confirmed its
earlier order in which it had retained jurisdiction over the consolidated
suits. 1 42 In this same opinion and order, however, the court ordered the
dismissal of the plaintiff's non-severed claims without prejudice, pending adjudication of the government's case. 143 The district court subsequently entered a civil judgment in favor of the defendants in accordance with the
14
"seemingly 'final' " memorandum opinion and order.
Examining the district court's opinion and orders arising out of the disposition of plaintiff's claim, 145 the court of appeals concluded that "the district court intended to retain jurisdiction over [plaintiff's non-severed, general charges], and not to dismiss those counts." 146 The Third Circuit was
persuaded that the proceedings below remained " 'open,' 'unfinished,' and
'inconclusive,' "147 because the opportunity to submit evidence remained
open 148 and because consolidation had been, in part, for the purpose of

142. 567 F.2d at 241. The district court noted that, because the relief sought by the plaintiff
and the Government was substantially identical, its March 5th order retaining jurisdiction controlled. Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that its decision as to the plaintiff's "claim" would
be delayed pending receipt of all the data from the Government's action. Id., quoting Brace v.
O'Neill, No. 74-339, slip op. at 3-4 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1976). It is unclear whether the district
court was referring to the plaintiffis non-severed claims and/or the plaintiff's individual claim of
harassment. See 567 F.2d at 241. The district court did, however, summarize its opinion as
follows:
[Tlhe issues raised by plaintiff founded upon alleged discriminatory employment practices
[Counts I, II, and IV] are substantially identical to the ones that prevail in [the Government's case]. For the reasons noted heretofore, we believe that our decision on this issue
should be held in abeyance pending our disposition of [the Government's case].
Id., quoting Brace v. O'Neill, No. 74-339, slip op. at 7 (E.D. Pa. June 4, 1976) (footnote and
citations omitted) (emphasis by the Third Circuit).
143. 567 F.2d at 241. For the text of this order, see note 136 supra.
144. 567 F.2d at 241. The Brace court ordered judgment for defendants without specifying
which claim or claims the plaintiff had lost. See id.
145. See id. at 242. In interpreting the June 4th order, the majority relied on the district
court's June 4th opinion. Id. at 242 n.25a. It reasoned that such reliance was necessary since
the order itself was ambiguous in dismissing plaintiff's non-severed claims without prejudice but
conditioning the dismissal on a final decision in the government's case. Id. For the text of the
June 4th order, see notes 136 & 137 supra.
146. 567 F.2d at 242.
147. Id., quoting Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546. The dissent contended that court-imposed delays might adversely affect the plaintiffs rights if not deprive her
of them. 567 F.2d at 247 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). The majority, however, dismissed the
"danger of denying justice by delay," concluding that
the mere prospect of delay cannot create appellate jurisdiction where no appropriate appealable district court order has been entered. We, too, are aware of the "danger of
denying justice by delay," . .. but we are also cognizant that there are comparable if not
greater dangers present were we to exercise appellate jurisdiction over nonappealable
orders entered in live and continuing controversies. ...
Id. at 243 n.27a, quoting Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379 U.S. at 153.
148. 567 F.2d at 242. The Brace majority noted that "the district court provided that all
parties may offer evidence on all claims (except Brace's [individual] retaliation claim) after the
conclusion of the City's study." Id. (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
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adjudication. 149 Furthermore, the non-severed claims were so similar that,
according to the Brace court, a consistent disposition must have been intended. 150 Lastly, a decision on all questions of liability and damages as to
the non-severed claims had been postponed for the taking of additional evi51

dence. 1

Turning to the plaintiff's individual claim of harassment, the court remarked that the district court's finding for the defendants constituted a dismissal with prejudice. 1 52 Nevertheless, the court interpreted the dismissal
15
as a stay, maintaining that the order was not final for purposes of appeal.'
The Brace court reasoned that, because the class which the plaintiff sought
to represent had been the beneficiary of at least four district court orders for
relief since the instant appeal was taken, 154 the plaintiff's case was ongoing. 155 The court further noted that the district court's retention of jurisdiction for the taking of additional evidence indicated that plaintiff's individual
claim was not "suspended" or "comatose." 156
Despite the majority's claim to have applied a practical approach to finality, 157 Judge Rosenn, dissenting, concluded that the court had "erroneously given the requirement of finality a technical rather than a practical
effect." 1' Judge Rosenn first asserted that, because the district court had

149. Id.
150. Id. In particular, the Brace Court noted that "the similarity between the two cases and
their subject matter, the joint conduct of their proceedings, and the identity in part of the relief
sought make it likely, and in fact it was so expressed, that a simultaneous and consistent disposition was intended." Id.
151. Id. The Brace court noted that the district court had never ruled specifically on the
plaintiff's motions relating to defendants' hiring and promotion practices but, rather, had delayed decision on all questions of liability and damages (as to Counts I, II, and IV) until the
completion of the City's study. Id.
152. Id. at 244. For the effect of a dismissal with prejudice, see note 135 supra.
153. 567 F.2d at 244 n.29a. The court noted that, as a general rule, a stay order is not
appealable. See id. In extraordinary circumstances, however, "tantamount to a dismissal of the
action," a stay can be appealed. Id., citing Haberern v. Lehigh & N.E. Ry., 544 F.2d 581, 584
(3d Cir. 1977); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (U.S. Steel-Clariton Works), 525 F.2d 151, 155-56
(3rd Cir. 1975). Additionally, the court concluded that, absent extraordinary circumstances,
mandamus was inappropriate. 567 F.2d at 244 n.29a. For a discussion of mandamus, see notes
200-06 and accompanying text infra. Finally, the court noted that, until there was an entry of a
final order or a rule 54(b) certification, an appeal could not be taken. See 567 F.2d at 244 n.29a.
For a discussion of rule 54(b), see notes 207-15 and accompanying text infra.
154. 567 F.2d at 244 n.29a.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. See id.at 239 n.5, 243.
158. Id. at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). In summarizing the facts of Brace, Judge Rosenn
paid close attention to the effect that the court's delay had upon the plaintiffs substantive rights
and financial resources. See id. at 246-47 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Judge
Rosenn's previous views toward a practical approach to finality, see notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra.
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explicitly dismissed the plaintiff's non-severed claims, the order was final
and the plaintiff should have been granted the appeal 159 since appeals "are
taken from the orders of a court, not from its opinions." 160
Alternatively, had the dismissal without prejudice been, in effect, a stay
of the proceedings, 16 1 Judge Rosenn would have found that, on balance,
"the injustice of withholding immediate review outweighed the danger
of
piecemeal review. 16 2 As to the plaintiff's individual claim of harassment,
Judge Rosenn disputed the argument that the plaintiff's benefits from interim district court orders were enough evidence to deem plaintiff's claim
not indefinitely delayed and, therefore, final. 163 Judge Rosenn reasoned
that, despite the district court's affirmative action, plaintiff could neither par1 64
ticipate as a party in the government's case, nor demand interim relief.
It is submitted that, although the Brace majority did not specifically
attempt to use section 1257 cases to support its decision under section 1291,

159. See 567 F.2d at 247-48 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Judge Rosenn stated that it is well
established that "a dismissal without prejudice is ordinarily final for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §
1291." Id. at 247 (Rosenn, J., dissenting), citing 9 J. MOORE FEDERAL PRACTICE
110.13[1],
at 152 (1975). So, too, he deemed the dismissal of plaintiff's individual harassment claim to be a
final order. 567 F.2d at 247 (Rosenn, J.,dissenting). Judge Rosenn noted that, according to the
majority, the district court order dismissing the plaintiff's non-severed claims was ambiguous
because it was qualified pending determination of the government's case. See id. Unlike the
majority, however, Judge Rosenn would have remanded the ambiguous district court order for
clarification. See id. at 248 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). He reasoned "that the district court would
be in a better position to assess its own intent." Id.
160. 567 F.2d at 247 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). Judge Rosenn explained
the source of his disagreement with the majority as follows:
In many cases, opinions are unclear or are brief, giving little understanding of the basis
for the order. For this reason, courts of appeals review orders, judging appealability solely
from the content of the order. . . . Ordinarily, we view the opinion for its value in support of the disposition of a case, but an appellate court does not substitute its understanding of the order for that of the district court. I therefore cannot agree with the majority's
assessment that the basic difference that divides us in [this part of the] dissent is the
interpretation of the June 4th district court order and not a legal principle.
Id. at 247-48 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (emphasis supplied). It is somewhat difficult to understand, however, how the dissent justified presuming the district court's intent after having concluded that it was generally better to remand such an issue to the district court and after
concluding that the district court's orders were, "to say the least, unclear." See id. at 247
(Rosenn, J., dissenting).
161. See id. at 244 n.29a. As to the plaintiffs indvidual harassment claim, the DickinsonGillespie balancing test would seemingly be satisfied if the dismissal were deemed a stay order.
Id. at 250 n.9 (Rosenn, J., dissenting), citing Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d at 629
(Rosenn, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Judge Rosenn's dissent in Hackett, see notes 55-59
and accompanying text supra. In avoiding the general rule of nonappealability of stay orders,
Judge Rosenn remarked:
This court's treatment of the appealability under section 1291 of stay orders ... has not
been inflexible. . . .The rule of this circuit is not that stay orders are never final; rather
the cases teach that it is the duty of this court to examine the circumstances of each case
to determine whether an appeal may be taken.
567 F.2d 249 (Rosenn, J., dissenting) (footnote and citations omitted).
162. 567 F.2d at 250 n.9 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 250 n.10 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the plaintiff stood simply
"as a mere spectator while other parties decide[d] her fate." Id.
164. Id.
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the same type of restrictive analysis which is appropriate under section 1257
was invoked by the Brace court. 165 Arguably, the Third Circuit's failure to
distinguish the provisions could have affected the majority's analysis. 16 6 The
dissent, therefore, might have bolstered its criticism of the majority by not
only noting the majority's failure to invoke the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing
test, but also by observing that, if the court were to recognize the differences in purpose and context between sections 1291 and 1257, the majority
might have followed a truly practical approach. 167 Furthermore, the dissent
might have criticized the majority's failure to separate the collateral order
test from the "pure" section 1291 balancing test under Dickinson and Gillespie. 168
The remaining problems created by Brace center on reconciling the
acceptance of the Supreme Court's practical approach language with the

165. For a discussion of why § 1257 should be interpreted more restrictively than § 1291, see
notes 81-88 and accompanying text supra.
166. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 366 n.14, 368 & n.28, 369 & nn.33 & 35 (3d
Cir. 1976). See also notes 81-88 and accompanying text supra.
167. For a discussion of the policy and language distinctions between §§ 1257 and 1291, see
notes 81-88 and accompanying text supra. Arguably, by reasoning that a court of appeals should
disregard district court opinions and determine appealability solely on the content of district
court orders, the dissent was applying a mechanistic, rather than a practical, approach. See 567
F.2d at 247 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). It is suggested, however, that practicality, for "pure" §
1291 purposes, addresses the plight of the parties in terms of the inconvenience and costs of
piecemeal review balanced against the danger of injustice caused by delay. See Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 477 n.30 (1978); Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp., 379
U.S. at 153-54.
168. See 567 F.2d at 243 & n.27a. Arguably, the dissent alluded to separating the collateral
order doctrine from "pure" § 1291 considerations by referring to the Cohen and Gillespie tests
separately. See id. at 252 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). Also, Judge Rosenn referred generally to
having distinguished these tests for § 1291 finality purposes five years earlier in Hackett. See id.
at 250 n.9 (Rosenn, J., dissenting), citing Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d at 626-27,
629 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). In Hackett, Judge Rosenn maintained that these tests ought to be
treated as separate means for obtaining an appeal because, under Dickinson and Gillespie, finality must be judged in terms of the merits while, under Cohen, finality is decided in view of the
collateral issue. See Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d at 620 (Rosenn, J., dissenting). It
is arguable, however, that Judge Rosenn's conclusion in Hackett, if it stands for the proposition
that the balancing test is satisfied by a finding that the merits of the case as to the appealing
party are effectively determined, may not have withstood Supreme Court scrutiny. Compare id.
with Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476-77 & n.30 (1978). But see note 57
supra. Nevertheless, neither the practice of separating collateral order considerations from pure
§ 1291 decisions nor the use of the Dickinson-Gillespie test for analyzing pure § 1291 determinations have been explicitly overruled by the Supreme Court. See Coopers & Lybrand v.
Livesay, 437 U.S. at 477. Therefore, because the Coopers & Lybrand Court merely held that
an order denying class certification was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine or the
"death knell" doctrine, it appears possible to decide correctly that an appeal is to be granted
under a pure § 1291 analysis if the merits of the case are effectively terminated, thereby causing
the danger of injustice created by delay to outweigh the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal
review. See note 57 supra. As to Judge Rosenn's conclusion in Hackett that an order denying
class certification is appealable under either Cohen or Dickinson-Gillespie, the Supreme Court
has explicitly disagreed. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. at 477.
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utilization of a technical or restrictive approach. 169 Although, as in Fiumara,170 the Third Circuit has paid lip service to the Cohen-Abney test in
determing whether orders are collateral,' 71 mere recitation of this test, or of
the precept mandating a "practical rather than a technical construction of the
finality requirement," ' 72 will not result in consistent determinations of appealability. It is suggested that the Third Circuit might find the true course
of practicality if it recognized that the "pure" balancing analysis of Gillespie
and Dickinson is a separate test from that of the collateral order doctrine. 173
With this in mind, the further realization that section 1257 cases should not
be used in interpreting section 1291,174 and that section 1291 should not be
so restrictively construed-even though there are good reasons for restricting final judgments under section 1257 175 -should lead the Third Circuit to
the correct path of practicality. Accordingly, in determining whether to grant
an appeal, it is submitted that the Third Circuit should first apply the
Dickinson-Gillespie balancing test for finality, and, if the party seeking an
appeal cannot meet its requirements, then the court should examine the
applicability of the Abney collateral order criteria.
III. A

BRIEF SURVEY OF INCIDENTAL AVENUES OF APPEAL

A. Interlocutory Orders and Appealability Under Section 1292(a)
An additional avenue of appeal is provided by the statutory grant of
76
jurisdiction to the courts of appeals to review certain interlocutory orders .
Under section 1292(a)(1) of the Judicial Code, the courts of appeals are
granted jurisdiction over interlocutory orders of a district court "granting,
continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court."177 Section 1292(a) also grants the courts of appeals power
to review certain judgments in civil actions for patent infringement1 78 and

169. See 567 F.2d at 245 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
170. For a discussion of Fiumara, see notes 116-19 and accompanying text supra.
171. 605 F.2d at 118.
172. See Brace v. O'Neill, 567 F.2d at 243, quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S.
156, 171 (1974); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. at 546.
173. For a discussion of the Abney criteria for determining the appealability of collateral
orders, see notes 97-101 and accompanying text supra.
174. See Bachowski v. Usery, 545 F.2d 363, 367-71 (3d Cir. 1976).
175. See notes 83-85 and accompanying text supra.
176. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976). If the broader final decision test of § 1291 cannot be
met, appellate jurisdiction under § 1292(a) is often sought. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d
at 1346. For a discussion of the various types of interlocutory orders which are appealable under
§ 1292(a), see notes 177-80 and accompanying text infra.
177. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1976).
178. Id. § 1292(a)(4). The courts of appeals have jurisdiction over "[j]udgments in civil actions
for patent infringement which are final except for accounting." Id.
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interlocutory orders and decrees relating to receiverships 179 and admiralty
issues. 180
Despite the objective of avoiding piecemeal review of nonfinal orders, 181 Congress has apparently recognized a litigant's need to challenge
interlocutory orders which could have "serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence[s]." 182 A certain degree of elasticity with respect to injunctions
was created in order to prevent such irreparable harm as could be created
from an erroneous order.' 83 Although that provision itself does not limit
review to such serious circumstances, the Supreme Court has been very
8 4
hesitant to allow review of interlocutory orders.1
Not surprisingly, the Third Circuit also applies section 1292(a)(1) restrictively, 185 adopting the narrow construction applied by the Supreme Court

179. Id. § 1292(a)(2). Section 1292(a)(2) provides for appellate jurisdiction over "[i]nterlocutory orders appointing receivers, or refusing orders to wind up receiverships or to take steps to
accomplish the purposes thereof, such as directing sales or other disposals of property." Id.
180. Id. § 1292(a)(3). The courts of appeals have jurisdiction over "[i]nterlocutory decrees of
such district courts or the judges thereof determining the rights and liabilities of the parties to
admiralty cases in which appeals from final decrees are allowed." Id.
181. See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480 (1978); Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 180 (1955); Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d
at 1346; Mayershy v. Celebrezze, 353 F.2d 89, 89 (3d Cir. 1965) (per curiam). The Gardner
Court, particularly, emphasized "the long established policy against piecemeal appeal.
437
U.S. at 480.
182. See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955). As the Baltimore
Contractors Court noted:
[N]o discussion of the underlying reasons for modifying the rule of finality appears in the
legislative history, although the changes seem plainly to spring from a developing need to
permit litigants to effecttbally challenge interlocutory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence. . . . The Congress is in a position to weigh the competing interests of
the dockets of the trial and appellate courts, to consider the practicability of savings in
time and expense, and to give proper weight to the effect on litigants.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See generally 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, E. COOPER & E. GRESSMAN,
FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3921 (1977) [hereinafter cited as C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER]; Note, supra note 39, at 367-68.
183. See Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955); Stateside Mach.
Co. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480, 482 (3d Cir. 1975). See also 16 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra
note 182, § 3921; Note, supra note 39, at 367-68. At least one commentator has noted that:
An erroneous order either granting or denying a preliminary injunction, for instance,
may have consequences that cannot effectively be cured by formal reversal many months
or years later. The statutory provisions for interlocutory appeal from injunction[s] ...
may be justified by the determination that the danger of injury simply outweighs the costs
of interlocutory appeal.
16 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra, § 3920, at 6.
184. See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 437 U.S. 478, 480-82 (1978);
Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955). The Gardner Court concluded that this "exception is a narrow one." 437 U.S. at 480. In Baltimore Contractors, the
Supreme Court engaged in a thorough discussion of section 1292(a)(1) and concluded that the
district court's order denying a stay under the Arbitration Act was a step in controlling the suit
before the trial court and not a refusal of an interlocutory injunction within the meaning of
section 1292(a)(1). See 348 U.S. at 185.
185. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d at 1348-51. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's
restrictive approach in cases involving section 1291, see notes 51-66 & 128-56 and accompanying
text supra.
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and the Second Circuit. 186 In Hoots v. Pennsylvania,1 8 7 for example, the
Third Circuit recently outlined two criteria for appealability under section
12 92(a)(1): 1) "the original or prior order must have been injunctive in
character,"1 88 and 2) "that injunction must have been modified in some respect by the order from which the appeal has been taken." 189 Finding that
it was not bound by "[t]he literal characterization of an order as an injunction" 190 the Hoots court concluded that an order commanding preparation of
a remedial school desegregation plan 191 did not constitute an injunction
under section 1292(a)(1). 192 Alternatively, the Hoots court concluded that,
even if the order in question were an injunction, the later order denying
defendants' motion for approval of a desegregation plan, filed pursuant to the
original order, did not modify that original order and, thus, was not appeal93
able.1

186. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d at 1348 n.42. The Hoots court noted that
"literalism has not been the approved canon of construction for the interlocutory appeals statute," and that, instead, "the courts have looked to the presumed purpose of the .. .exception
to the historical rule prohibiting appeals from nonfinal judgments, and have classified as injunctions within the meaning of § 1292(a)(1) those interlocutory orders 'of serious, perhaps irreparable consequence.' " Id., quoting Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480, 482 (3d Cir.
1975) (footnotes omitted), quoting Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176, 181
(1955).
The Hoots court also (,uoted with approval the conclusion of the Second Circuit that §
1292(a)(1) "was intended as a narrow exception to the policy of the basic final judgment
rule. . . . The great advantages of that policy in the administration of federal justice dictate
against a reliance on the strict letter of § 1292(a)(1) which would cause the exception to encroach
unduly upon the rule." 587 F.2d at 1348 n.2, quoting Western Geophysical Co. of America v.
Bolt Assocs. Inc., 463 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972) (citation
omitted).
187. 587 F.2d at 1340. For a discussion of Hoots, see notes 60-66 and accompanying text
supra.
188. 587 F.2d at 1348.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 1348 n.42, quoting Stateside Mach. Co. v. Alperin, 526 F.2d 480, 482 (3d Cir.
1975).
191. See Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. 807, 824-25 (W.D. Pa. 1973), revd, 587 F.2d
1340 (3d Cir. 1978).
192. 587 F.2d at 1351. As to the portion of the order in which the defendants were "enjoined
and restrained from taking any action, directly or indirectly, that may in any way limit or
otherwise affect any school assignment options that could possibly be considered or proposed by
any parties to this action," the Hoots court reasoned that the § 1292(a)(1) requirements were not
met because the order was presently operative and unmodified by any subsequent district court
order. Id. at 1348 n.43, quoting Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 359 F. Supp. at 825. The court also
concluded that the order requiring the submission of a desegregation plan was not an injunction, but "merely a step in a judicial proceeding leading to the formulation of ... relief [Ain
appeal from the .. .order could not vest jurisdiction in a reviewing court because the 'appellate
perspective' remained subject to alteration until the particulars of the remedy had been formulated." 587 F.2d at 1351.
193. 587 F.2d at 1351. The Hoots court reasoned that the order denying defendants' motion
for approval of a desegregation plan did not "specify the nature and scope of the desegregation
remedy," but rather, "continue[d] to look toward the future formulation of a decree which
[would] afford the plaintiffs the relief to which they are entitled under the district court's original order." id.
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B. Discretionary Appealability of Orders Involving a Controlling
Question of Law Under the Interlocutory Appeals Act
194
The Interlocutory Appeals Act, section 1292(b) of the Judicial Code,
provides a distinct avenue of appeal for certain orders which are not otherwise immediately appealable.1 95 For an appeal to be proper under this provision, the district court judge must certify that the order appealed from
contains a controlling question of law with respect to which there are substantial grounds for differences of opinion, creating the likelihood that an
immediate appeal will materially advance a final determination of the litigation. 196 Consistent with the intent of Congress to grant only a narrow, discretionary exception to the final judgment rule, the Supreme Court interprets section 1292(b) strictly. 1 97 Not surprisingly, the Third Circuit has also
construed this jurisdictional grant in a narrow fashion. 198

C. Mandamus: An Extraordinary Avenue of Review
Although not strictly an avenue of appeal, 199 the common law writ of
mandamus can be used as an alternate route for review. 20 0 Mandamus is
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
195. Id. Section 1292(b) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise appealable
under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, he shall so state in writing in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon,
in its discretion, permit an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it
within ten days after the entry of the order: Provided, however, that application for an
appeal hereunder shall not stay proceedings in the district court unless the district judge
or the Court of Appeals or a judge thereof shall so order.
Id. (emphasis in original).
196. See id.
197. See Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 474-75 (1978) (party seeking § 1292(b)
appealability faces harsh burden in light of congressional restrictions). See also Liberty Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 745-46 (1976) (application to court of appeals must be made
within 10 days and all § 1292(b) criteria must be complied with in a strict fashion); Tidewater
Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 164-74 (1972) (§ 1292(b) does not establish appellate
jurisdiction over certain government civil antitrust cases).
198. See, e.g., Gardner v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 559 F.2d 209, 212 (3d Cir. 1977),
aff'd on other grounds, 437 U.S. 478 (1978); Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 550 F.2d
860, 862-63 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 933 (1977); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d
747, 753-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 885 (1974).
199. See Schlagenhauf v. Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 110 (1964) (writ of mandamus not to be used
as substitute for appeal, but appropriate for clear abuses of discretion); Ex parte Fahey, 332
U.S. 258, 260 (1947) (writ of mandamus reserved for extraordinary cases, not mere substitute for
appeal). See also Hoots v. Pennsylvania, 587 F.2d at 1346. The Hoots court noted that the
"jurisdiction of the courts of appeals normally is confined to the review of final orders ... or to
the classes of interlocutory orders described in 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976)." Id. (footnote omitted).
200. The power of the federal courts to grant mandamus was "given a statutory basis by the
All Writs Act." Rapp v. Van Dusen, 350 F.2d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 1965) (footnote omitted). See 28
U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). Under the All Writs Act, "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective
jurisdictions and agreeable to usages and principles of law." Id.
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appropriate when a district judge fails to lawfully exercise the authority that
is vested in the district court when it is necessary to effectuate a remedy to
which a party is entitled in an extraordinary case where the potential for
irreparable harm is plainly apparent.201 The Supreme Court has repeatedly
cautioned, however, that "[t]he remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be
'2 0 2
invoked only in extraordinary situations."
In restricting the availability of mandamus, the Court has reasoned that
the consequences of forcing a district court judge to become a litigant are
undesirable, 2 0 3 and that the policy of discouraging piecemeal review under20 4
lying section 1291 similarly compels a restrictive application of mandamus.
This restrictive view of mandamus has been followed consistently in the
20 5
Third Circuit.
D. Certifying Finality Under Rule 54(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,2 0 6 appellate jurisdiction may be founded upon 1) a district court's determination
that there is no just reason for delay and 2) its entry of a final judgment
involving fewer than all claims or parties involved in a multiple claim and/or
multiple party civil action. 20 7 As stated by the Supreme Court, the basic
purposes of rule 54(b) are as follows: 1) to avoid uncertainty and possible
unjust delays which would result if appeal were postponed pending a final

201. See, e.g., Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 661-67 (1978); Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104, 109-10 (1964); Citibank v. Fullam, 580 F.2d 82, 86-87 (3d Cir. 1978). The
Will Court noted that mandamus has been used in the federal courts "to confine an inferior
court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority
when it is its duty to do so." 437 U.S. at 661, quoting Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319
U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
202. Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976) (citations omitted). See also
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S.
379, 384-85 (1953); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947). In Ex parte Fahey, the
Court concluded that mandamus "should be resorted to only where appeal is a clearly inadequate remedy." 332 U.S. at 260.
203. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402 (1976); Bankers Life & Cas.
Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 384-85 (1953); Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947). The
Court concluded in Ex Parte Fahey that the exercise of mandamus obligates the district court
judge to obtain personal counsel or to rely on the litigants before the court to assert his defense.
332 U.S. at 260.
204. See Kerr v. United States Dist. Court, 426 U.S. 394, 403 (1976); Will v. United States,
389 U.S. 90, 96 (1967); Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1956).
205. See United States v. Helstoski, 576 F.2d 511, 516 (3d Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979).
206. FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) provides in pertinent part:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a claim,
counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, or when multiple parties are involved, the
court may direct the entry of a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the
claims or parties only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay
and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.
Id.
207. Id.
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decision of all claims; 208 and 2) to effecuate the policy of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in permitting "the liberal joinder of claims in multiple
09
claims actions" without seriously prejudicing any party."
In effect, rule 54(b) permits a district court to take a practical approach
to finality when multiple claims or parties are involved.2 1 0 It is clear, however, that the rule does not relax the fundamental finality requirement or
permit certification of an order which would not be a final decision under
section 1291 if sued on alone. 2 1 ' While the specific criteria upon which a
district judge should rely in ruling on applications for rule 54(b) certification
have never been explicitly enumerated by the Supreme Court 2 1 2-leading
213
-the
to a highly restrictive approach to the rule in the Third Circuit
208. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 434-36 (1956).
209. Id. at 432, 434-36. For a discussion of the purposes and significance of rule 54(b), see 10
C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §§ 2654, 2661 (1973). For example of instances in which the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure encourage or require the joinder
of multiple claims and parties, see FED. R. Clv. P. 13-14, 18-21. See also Cold Metal Process
Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co., 351 U.S.. 445, 451-53 (1956).
210. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 435 (1956). The Sears Court noted:
To meet the demonstrated need for flexibility, the District Court is used as a "dispatcher." It is permitted to determine, in the first instance, the appropriate time when
each 'final decision" upon "one or more but less than all" of the claims in a multiple
claims action is ready for appeal.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'r & Foundry Co.,
351 U.S. 445, 453 (1956). The Third Circuit articulated this principle by stating that rule 54(b)
"attempts to strike a balance between the undesirability of piecemeal appeals and the need for
making review available at a time that best serves the needs of the parties." Allis-Chalmers
Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 363 (3d Cir. 1975), noted in the Third Circuit
Review, 22 VILL. L. REv. 697 (1976). See also Aetna Ins. Co. v. Newton, 398 F.2d 729, 734 (3d
Cir. 1968); RePass v. Vreeland, 357 F.2d 801, 804 (3d Cir. 1966); Panichella v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 454-55 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 932 (1960).
211. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956). In Sears, the Court noted:
The District Court cannot, in the exercise of its discretion, treat as "final" that which is
not "final" within the meaning of § 1291. But the District Court may, by the exercise of
its discretion in the interest of sound judicial administration, release for appeal final decisions upon one or more, but less than all, claims in multiple claims actions.
Id. (emphasis in original). The Sears Court observed that rule 54(b) "merely administers [the
final decision requirement under § 1291] in a practical manner." Id. at 438. However, by its
"negative effect," rule 54(b) may operate "to restrict in a valid manner the number of appeals in
multiple claims actions." Id. See also Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 743 n.3
(1976); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360, 362-65 (3d Cir. 1975).
Accordingly, rule 54(b) "does not supersede any statute controlling appellate jurisdiction."
Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. at 437.
212. See Panichella v. Pennsylvania R.R., 252 F.2d 452, 454 (3d Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361
U.S. 932 (1960). The Panichella court, in noting that an abuse of a district court's discretion in
awarding a rule 54(b) order is reviewable, pointed out that "the Supreme Court has not
suggested any guide to [the] judgment [of] whether a 54(b) order reflects a proper exercise of
discretion." Id. But see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956) (courts of
appeals must not disturb district court's discretion in denying certification unless trial judge did
not consider relevant factors).
213. See, e.g., Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 597 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1979) (per
curiam), vacated and remanded, 100 S. Ct. 1460 (1980); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Philadelphia
Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 360 (3d Cir. 1975). For a discussion of the Third Circuit's restrictive
application of rule 54(b) as well as a general overview of the implementation of the rule, see
Note, A Proposed Two-Part Analysis for the Exercise of a Trial Judge's DiscretionaryCertification of a Claim as Final Under Rule 54(b) When a Counterclaim Remains Pending, 25 VILL. L.
REV. 179 (1980).
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Court has recently made clear that, because it requires a careful weighing of
all of the exigencies of a particular case, a district judge's decision on a rule
2 14
54(b) motion is entitled to "substantial deference" on appeal.
IV. CONCLUSION

As has been observed, the Third Circuit appears to be largely in agreement with the Supreme Court in utilizing a restrictive approach to appealability under section 1292(a), 2 15 the Interlocutory Appeals Act, 2 16 and the
mandamus power. 217 Further, the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Electric Co., 218 should go far to reconcile
219
the varying approaches of the courts to appealability under rule 54(b).
It is submitted, however, that the Third Circuit's inconsistency in applying the collateral order doctrine of Cohen 220 and its continuing refusal to
adopt a practical approach to finality under section 1291,221 have resulted in
an appellate system significantly more restrictive than, and at least arguably
inconsistent with, the intent of Congress and the mandates of the Supreme
Court. As evidenced by the Brace decision, this restrictive approach raises
the very real possibility of serious inconvenience and substantial injustice to
22 2
parties involved in complex litigation.
Consequently, it is suggested that the Third Circuit would do well to
reexamine its appealability analysis in light of the Dickinson-Gillespie balancing test for finality 223 and the Cohen-Abney criteria for application of the
collateral order doctrine. 224 In so doing, it is submitted, the court would be
likely to develop a more precise appealability analysis which would be consistent with the intent of Congress and the mandates of the Supreme Court,
as well as an effective tool of judicial administration and a fair and equitable
framework within which litigants may operate.
Gary A. Rome
214. Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. General Elec. Co., 100 S. Ct. 1460, 1466 (1980), vacating and
remanding 597 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam). The Curtiss-Wright Court reiterated that

rule 54(b) certification should not be routinely granted, but refused to "fix or sanction narrow
guidelines for the district courts to follow." 100 S. Ct. at 1466. Rather, the Court found that the
decision to grant a request for rule 54(b) certification was one committed "to the sound judicial
discretion of the district court" based upon the trial judge's evaluation of the equities of the
case. Id., citing Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Mackey, 351 U.S. 427, 437 (1956). The court stated
that once the trial judge's evaluation has been made, "the proper role of the Court of Appeals is
not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts but to make sure that the conclusions derived
from those weighings and assessments are juridically sound and supported by the record." 100
S. Ct. at 1466.
215. See notes 185-94 and accompanying text supra.
216. See notes 198-99 and accompanying text supra.
217. See notes 203-06 and accompanying text supra.
218. 100 S. Ct. 1460 (1980), vacating and remanding 597 F.2d 35 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
219. See notes 213-15 and accompanying text supra.
220. See notes 110-27 and accompanying text supra.
221. See notes 157-76 and accompanying text supra.
222. See notes 157-76 and accompanying text supra.
223. See notes 40-50 and accompanying text supra.
224. See notes 93-101 and accompanying text supra.
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